Fossil: The Default Content Security Policy (CSP)

When Fossil’s web interface generates an HTML page, it normally includes a Content Security Policy (CSP) in the <head>. The CSP specifies allowed sources for external resources such as images, CSS, javascript, and so forth. The purpose of CSP is to provide an extra layer of protection against cross-site scripting (XSS) and code injection attacks. Compatible web browsers will not use external resources unless they are specifically allowed by the CSP, which dramatically reduces the attack surface of the application.

Fossil does not rely on CSP for security. A Fossil server should be secure from attack even without CSP. Fossil includes built-in server-side content filtering logic. For example, Fossil purposely breaks <script> tags when it finds them in Markdown and Fossil Wiki documents. And the Fossil build process scans the source code for potential injection vulnerabilities and refuses to compile if any problems are found. However, CSP provides an additional layer of defense against undetected bugs that might lead to a vulnerability.

The Default Restrictions

The default CSP used by Fossil is as follows:

default-src 'self' data:;
script-src 'self' 'nonce-$nonce';
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
img-src * data:;

The default is recommended for most installations. However, the site administrators can overwrite this default CSP using the default-csp setting. For example, CSP restrictions can be completely disabled by setting the default-csp to:

default-src *;

The following sections detail the maining of the default CSP setting.

default-src 'self' data:

This policy means mixed-origin content isn’t allowed, so you can’t refer to resources on other web domains. Browsers will ignore a link like the one in the following Markdown under our default CSP:

![fancy 3D Fossil logotype](https://i.imgur.com/HalpMgt.png)

If you look in the browser’s developer console, you should see a CSP error when attempting to render such a page.

The default policy does allow inline data: URIs, which means you could data-encode your image content and put it inline within the document:

![small inline image](...)

That method is best used for fairly small resources. Large data: URIs are hard to read and edit. There are secondary problems as well: if you put a large image into a Fossil forum post this way, anyone subscribed to email alerts will get a copy of the raw URI text, which can amount to pages and pages of ugly Base64-encoded text.

For inline images within embedded documentation, it suffices to store the referred-to files in the repo and then refer to them using repo-relative URLs:

![large inline image](./inlineimage.jpg)

This avoids bloating the doc text with data: URI blobs:

There are many other cases, covered below.

img-src * data:

It was not always thus, but after careful consideration, we’ve chosen to leave the source of inline images unrestricted by default in Fossil. This allows you to pull them in from remote systems, to pull them from within the Fossil repository itself, or to use data: URIs.

If you are certain all images come from only within the repository, you can close off certain risks — tracking pixels, broken image format decoders, system dialog box spoofing, etc. — by changing this to “img-src 'self'” possibly followed by “data:” if you will also use data: URIs.

style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'

This policy allows CSS information to come from separate files hosted under the Fossil repo server’s Internet domain. It also allows inline CSS <style> tags within the document text.

The 'unsafe-inline' declaration allows CSS within individual HTML elements:

<p style="margin-left: 4em">Indented text.</p>

As the "unsafe-" prefix on the name implies, the 'unsafe-inline' feature is suboptimal for security. However, there are a few places in the Fossil-generated HTML that benefit from this flexibility and the work-arounds are verbose and difficult to maintain. Furthermore, the harm that can be done with style injections is far less than the harm possible with injected javascript. And so the 'unsafe-inline' compromise is accepted for now, though it might go away in some future release of Fossil.

script-src 'self' 'nonce-%s'

This policy disables in-line JavaScript and only allows <script> elements if the <script> includes a nonce attribute that matches the one declared by the CSP. That nonce is a large random number, unique for each HTTP page generated by Fossil, so an attacker cannot guess the value, so the browser will ignore an attacker’s injected JavaScript.

That nonce can only come from one of three sources, all of which should be protected at the system administration level on the Fossil server:

Fossil server C code: All code paths in Fossil that emit <script> elements include the nonce attribute. There are several cases, such as the “JavaScript” section of a custom skin. That text is currently inserted into each HTML page generated by Fossil,¹ which means it needs to include a nonce attribute to allow it to run under this default CSP. We consider JavaScript emitted via these paths to be safe because it’s audited by the Fossil developers. We assume that you got your Fossil server’s code from a trustworthy source and that an attacker cannot replace your Fossil server binary.
TH1 code: The Fossil TH1 interpreter pre-defines the $nonce variable for use in custom skins. For example, some of the stock skins that ship with Fossil include a wall clock feature up in the corner that updates once a minute. These paths are safe in the default Fossil configuration because only the all-powerful Setup user can write TH1 code that executes in the server’s running context.

There is, however, a default-disabled path to beware of, covered in the next section.
CGI server extensions: Fossil exports the nonce to the CGI in the FOSSIL_NONCE environment variable, which it can then use in <script> elements it generates. Because these extensions can only be installed by the Fossil server’s system administrator, this path is also considered safe.

Cross-Site Scripting via Ordinary User Capabilities

We’re so restrictive about how we treat JavaScript because it can lead to difficult-to-avoid scripting attacks. If we used the same CSP for <script> tags as for <style> tags, anyone with check-in rights on your repository could add a JavaScript file to your repository and then refer to it from other content added to the site. Since JavaScript code can access any data from any URI served under its same Internet domain, and many Fossil users host multiple Fossil repositories under a single Internet domain, such a CSP would only be safe if all of those repositories are trusted equally.

Consider the Chisel hosting service, which offers free Fossil repository hosting to anyone on the Internet, all served under the same http://chiselapp.com/user/$NAME/$REPO URL scheme. Any one of those hundreds of repositories could trick you into visiting their repository home page, set to an HTML-formatted embedded doc page via Admin → Configuration → Index Page, with this content:

<script src="/doc/trunk/bad.js"></script>

That script can then do anything allowed in JavaScript to any other Chisel repository your browser can access. The possibilities for mischief are vast. For just one example, if you have login cookies on four different Chisel repositories, your attacker could harvest the login cookies for all of them through this path if we allowed Fossil to serve JavaScript files under the same CSP policy as we do for CSS files.

This is why the default configuration of Fossil has no way for embedded docs, wiki articles, tickets, forum posts, or tech notes to automatically insert a nonce into the page content. This is all user-provided content, which could link to user-provided JavaScript via check-in rights, effectively giving all such users a capability that is usually reserved to the repository’s administrator.

The default-disabled TH1 documents feature is the only known path around this restriction. If you are serving a Fossil repository that has any user you do not implicitly trust to a level that you would willingly run any JavaScript code they’ve provided, blind, you must not give the --with-th1-docs option when configuring Fossil, because that allows substitution of the pre-defined $nonce TH1 variable into HTML-formatted embedded docs:

<script src="/doc/trunk/bad.js" nonce="$nonce"></script>

Even with this feature enabled, you cannot put <script> tags into Fossil Wiki or Markdown-formatted content, because our HTML generators for those formats purposely strip or disable such tags in the output. Therefore, if you trust those users with check-in rights to provide JavaScript but not those allowed to file tickets, append to wiki articles, etc., you might justify enabling TH1 docs on your repository, since the only way to create or modify HTML-formatted embedded docs is through check-ins.

Serving Files Within the Limits

There are several ways to serve files within the above restrictions, avoiding the need to override the default CSP. In decreasing order of simplicity and preference:

Within embedded documentation (only!) you can refer to files stored in the repo using document-relative file URLs:
```
 ![inline image](./inlineimage.jpg)
```
Relative file URLs don’t work from wiki articles, tickets, forum posts, or tech notes, but you can still refer to them inside the repo with /doc or /raw URLs:
```
 ![inline image](/doc/trunk/images/inlineimage.jpg)
 <img src="/raw/logo.png" style="float: right; margin-left: 2em">
```
Store the files as unversioned content, referred to using /uv URLs instead:
```
 ![logo](/uv/logo.png)
```
Use the optional CGI server extensions feature to serve such content via /ext URLs.
Put Fossil behind a front-end proxy server as a virtual subdirectory within the site, so that our default CSP’s “self” rules match static file routes on that same site. For instance, your repo might be at https://example.com/code, allowing documents in that repo to refer to:
- images as /image/foo.png
- JavaScript files as /js/bar.js
- CSS style sheets as /style/qux.css
Although those files are all outside the Fossil repo at /code, keep in mind that it is the browser’s notion of “self” that matters here, not Fossil’s. All resources come from the same Internet domain, so the browser cannot distinguish Fossil-provided content from static content served directly by the proxy server.

This method opens up many other potential benefits, such as TLS encryption, high-performance tuning via custom HTTP headers, integration with other web technologies like PHP, etc.

You might wonder why we rank in-repo content as most preferred above. It is because the first two options are the only ones that cause such resources to be included in an initial clone or in subsequent repo syncs. The methods further down the list have a number of undesirable properties:

Relative links to out-of-repo files break in fossil ui when run on a clone.
Absolute links back to the public repo instance solve that:
```
![inline image](https://example.com/images/logo.png)
```
...but using them breaks some types of failover and load-balancing schemes, because it creates a single point of failure.
Absolute links fail when one’s purpose in using a clone is to recover from the loss of a project web site by standing that clone up as a server elsewhere. You probably forgot to copy such external resources in the backup copies, so that when the main repo site disappears, so do those files.

Unversioned content is in the middle of the first list above — between fully-external content and fully in-repo content — because it isn’t included in a clone unless you give the --unversioned flag. If you then want updates to the unversioned content to be included in syncs, you have to give the same flag to a sync command. There is no equivalent with other commands such as up and pull, so you must then remember to give fossil uv commands when necessary to pull new unversioned content down.

Thus our recommendation that you refer to in-repo resources exclusively.

Overriding the Default CSP

If you wish to relax the default CSP’s restrictions or to tighten them further, there are multiple ways to accomplish that.

The following methods are listed in top-down order to give the simplest and most straightforward method first. Further methods dig down deeper into the stack, which is helpful to understand even if you end up using a higher-level method.

The `default-csp` Setting

If the default-csp setting is defined and is not an empty string, its value is injected into the page using TH1 via one or more of the methods below, depending on the skin you’re using and local configuration.

Changing this setting is the easiest way to set a nonstandard CSP on your site.

Because a blank setting tells Fossil to use its hard-coded default CSP, you have to say something like the following to get a repository without content security policy restrictions:

$ fossil set -R /path/to/served/repo.fossil default-csp 'default-src *'

We recommend that instead of using the command line to change this setting that you do it via the repository’s web interface, in Admin → Settings. Write your CSP rules in the edit box marked "default-csp". Do not add hard newlines in that box: the setting needs to be on a single long line. Beware that changes take effect immediately, so be careful with your edits: you could end up locking yourself out of the repository with certain CSP changes!

There are a few reasons why changing this setting via the command line is inadvisable, except for very short settings like the example above:

You have to be sure to set it on the repository where you want the CSP to apply. Changing this setting on your local clone doesn’t affect the remote repo you cloned from, which is most likely where you want the CSP restrictions.
For more complicated CSPs, the quoting rules for your shell and the CSP syntax may interact, making it difficult or impossible to set your desired CSP via the command line. Setting it via the web UI doesn’t have this problem.

TH1 Setup Hook

Fossil sets the TH1 variable $default_csp from the default-csp setting and uses that to inject the value into generated HTML pages in its stock configuration.

This means that another way you can override this value is to use the th1-setup hook script, which runs before TH1 processing happens during skin processing:

$ fossil set th1-setup "set default_csp {default-src 'self'}"

After the above, this is the cleanest method.

Fossil C Source Code

When you do neither of the above things, Fossil uses a hard-coded default.

We tell you about this not to suggest that you hack the Fossil C source code to change the CSP but simply to document the next step before we move down-stack.

Skin Header

In the normal case, Fossil injects the CSP retrieved by one of the above methods into the header of all HTML documents it generates:

<head>...
  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="...">
  ...

Fossil skips this when you’re using a custom skin and its Header section includes a <body> tag. This is because prior to Fossil 2.5, the Header for a custom skin normally contained everything from the opening <html> tag through the leading <body> tag. From that version onward, Fossil now generates that header when possible, so that the skin’s Header normally provides only the opening tags of the document body, rather than the HTML header.

When we added CSP support in Fossil 2.7, we made use of that mechanism to inject the CSP into the generated HTML document header.

For backwards compatibility, Fossil skips this when the skin’s Header includes a <body> tag. Fossil takes that as a hint that it’s dealing with a skin made in the pre-Fossil-2.5 days and doesn’t try to blindly override it.

The problem then is that you may be a Fossil user from the days before Fossil 2.5, and you may be using a custom skin. This includes users who selected one of the stock skins, since for the purposes of this section, there is no difference between the cases. If you go into Admin → Skins → Header and find a <body> tag, none of the above will apply to your repo since Fossil will not be injecting its CSP into your pages.

If you selected one of the stock skins (e.g. Khaki) prior to upgrading to Fossil 2.5+ and didn’t make any changes to it since that time, you can take the simplest option, which is to simply revert to the stock version of the skin, so your pages will have the CSP injected, at which point this document will begin describing what Fossil does with that repo.

If you’re using a customized version of one of the stock skins, the skinning mechanism has a diff feature to make it easier to fold your local changes into the stock version.

If you’re using a fully customized skin, we recommend replicating the method that the Bootstrap skin uses.² Alone among the stock Fossil skins, Bootstrap still does old-style Header processing, providing the entire HTML header and the start of the document body.

We do not recommend injecting an explicit Content-Security-Policy meta tag into a header to override Fossil’s default CSP. That means you have to edit the skin every time you want to change the CSP. Use the TH1 $default_csp variable like the Bootstrap skin does so you can use one of the methods above with your custom skin, so the CSP can vary independently of the skin.

Front-End Proxy

If your Fossil repo is behind some sort of HTTP front-end proxy, the preferred method for setting the CSP is via a custom HTTP header, which most HTTP reverse proxy programs allow.

Beware that if you have a CSP set via both the HTTP and HTML headers that the two CSPs merge, taking the most restrictive elements of each CSP. If you wish the proxy layer’s setting to completely override Fossil’s setting, you will need to combine that with one of the methods above to either remove the Fossil-provided CSP or to make Fossil provide a no-restrictions CSP which the front-end proxy can then tighten down.

Asides and Digressions:

Fossil might someday switch to serving the “JavaScript” section of a custom skin as a virtual text file, allowing it to be cached by the browser, reducing page load times.
The stock Bootstrap skin did provide redundant CSP text from Fossil 2.7 through Fossil 2.9, so setting the CSP via the higher level methods did not work with that skin. We fixed this in Fossil 2.10, but if you selected the Bootstrap skin prior to that, you’re now running on a copy of it stored in your repo settings table, so the change to the stock version of the skin won’t affect that repo automatically. You will have to either merge the diffs in with your local changes or revert to the stock version of the skin.

The Default Content Security Policy (CSP)