Fossil: The Default Content Security Policy (CSP)

One of the most important things you have to know about the default Fossil-provided <head> text is the Content Security Policy (CSP) it applies to your repository’s web interface. The current version applies the following restrictions:

default-src 'self' data

This policy means mixed-origin content isn’t allowed, so you can’t refer to resources on other web domains, so the following Markdown for an inline image hosted on another site will cause a CSP error:

     ![fancy 3D Fossil logotype](https://i.imgur.com/HalpMgt.png)

This policy allows inline data: URIs, which means you could data-encode your image content and put it inline within the document:

     ![small inline image](...)

That method is best used for fairly small resources. Large data: URIs are hard to read and edit. Keep in mind that if you put such a thing into a Fossil forum post, anyone subscribed to email alerts will get a copy of the raw URI text, which is really ugly.

For larger files, you could instead store the file in Fossil as:

versioned content retrieved via a /raw URL
unversioned content retrieved via a /uv URL

Another path around this restriction is to serve your repo behind an HTTP proxy server, allowing mixed-mode content serving, with static images and such served directly by the HTTP server and the dynamic content by Fossil. That allows a URI scheme that prevents the browser’s CSP enforcement from distinguishing content from Fossil proper and that from the front-end proxy.

style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'

This policy means CSS files can only come from the Fossil server or via a front-end proxy as in the inline image workarounds above. It also says that inline CSS is disallowed; this will give a CSP error:

    <p style="margin-left: 4em">Some bit of indented text</p>

In practice, this means you must put your CSS into the “CSS” section of a custom skin, not inline within Markdown, Wiki, or HTML tags. You can refer to specific tags in the document through “id” and “class” attributes.

The reason for this restriction might not be obvious, but the risks boil down to this: CSS is sufficiently powerful that if someone can apply their CSS to your site, they can make it say things you don’t want it to say, hide important information, and more. Thus, we restrict all CSS to come from trusted channels only.

We do currently trust CSS checked into the repository as a file, but that stance might be overly-trusting, so we might revoke it later, as we do for JavaScript:

script-src 'self' 'nonce-%s'

This policy means HTML <script> tags are only allowed to be emitted into the output HTML by Fossil C or TH1 code, because only code running in those contexts can correctly apply the random “nonce” attribute to the tag that matches the one declared in the CSP, which changes on each HTTP hit Fossil handles.

This means the workarounds given above will not work for JavaScript. In effect, the only JavaScript that Fossil can serve is that which it directly provided, such as that for the CSS section of the skin and that behind the default hamburger menu.

We’re so restrictive about how we treat JavaScript because it can lead to difficult-to-avoid cross-site scripting attacks.